Healthcare Deaths and Article 2: The Supreme Court’s Decision in Maguire


Categories:

Introduction

The circumstances in which Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights applies to deaths involving healthcare providers have been considered extensively by the domestic courts.

In R (Maguire) v HM Senior Coroner for Blackpool and Fylde [2023] UKSC 20, the Supreme Court considered the application of Article 2 to the death of a vulnerable adult living in a residential care home, whose death followed alleged failures in the provision of medical treatment.

The judgment provides important guidance on the distinction between ordinary clinical negligence, failures in systems designed to protect life, and breaches of the operational duty to protect individuals from known risks.

It also addresses the circumstances in which the enhanced investigative obligation under Article 2 arises, requiring an inquest to examine the broader circumstances in which a person came by their death.

The decision is particularly relevant to inquests involving hospitals, residential care homes, ambulance services and other healthcare providers.


The Facts of Maguire

Jacqueline Maguire, known as Jackie, was a 52-year-old woman with Down’s syndrome, learning disabilities and significant care needs. She lived in a residential care home and was subject to a deprivation of liberty authorisation.

In February 2017, Jackie became seriously unwell. Her condition deteriorated, and medical advice was sought from general practitioners and ambulance personnel.

Although consideration was given to transferring her to hospital, she remained at the care home overnight. She was subsequently admitted to hospital, where she died on 22 February 2017 from pneumonia and a perforated gastric ulcer with peritonitis.

Concerns arose about the decisions taken by the healthcare professionals involved, including whether Jackie should have been admitted to hospital earlier.

The Coroner initially proceeded on the basis that the enhanced investigative obligation under Article 2 was likely to apply. However, having heard the evidence, he concluded that the obligation was not engaged in a manner requiring an expanded conclusion.

The jury subsequently returned a conclusion of natural causes.

Jackie’s family challenged the Coroner’s decision. Their challenge was unsuccessful before the Divisional Court and Court of Appeal, and ultimately reached the Supreme Court.


The Duties Imposed by Article 2

Article 2 protects the right to life. In addition to prohibiting the unlawful taking of life, it imposes positive obligations upon the state to take appropriate steps to protect life.

In Maguire, Lord Sales identified two principal substantive positive obligations: the systems duty and the operational duty. These are distinct, although related, obligations. [§§9–11]

The Systems Duty

The systems duty requires the state to establish an appropriate legal and administrative framework for the protection of life.

In healthcare cases, this ordinarily requires an effective regulatory framework designed to secure appropriate professional standards and protect patients.

However, the existence of a clinical error, even one resulting in death, does not necessarily demonstrate a breach of the systems duty.

The Supreme Court reaffirmed the approach established by the European Court of Human Rights in Lopes de Sousa Fernandes v Portugal (2017) 66 EHRR 28.

Ordinarily, the state’s substantive obligations in the healthcare context are satisfied where an appropriate regulatory framework exists. Errors of clinical judgment or negligent coordination between healthcare professionals do not by themselves establish a breach of Article 2.

Exceptional circumstances may arise where a patient is knowingly denied access to life-saving emergency treatment, or where systemic or structural dysfunction results in a denial of such treatment.

The distinction is important. A failure by an individual clinician to recognise the seriousness of a patient’s condition is not necessarily equivalent to a failure by the state to establish an adequate system for responding to that condition.

The Operational Duty

The operational duty concerns the protection of particular individuals from risks to life.

In appropriate circumstances, state authorities must take reasonable steps to protect an individual where they know, or ought to know, of a real and immediate risk to that person’s life.

The duty derives principally from Osman v United Kingdom (1998) 29 EHRR 245.

However, the existence and scope of the operational duty depend upon the circumstances. In Maguire, the Supreme Court emphasised that the duty cannot be applied without considering the particular responsibility undertaken by the state, the nature of the risk and the protective measures reasonably available.

The position of an individual detained for psychiatric treatment, for example, may differ materially from that of a person receiving ordinary medical treatment.

Similarly, the fact that an individual is vulnerable, or subject to a deprivation of liberty authorisation, does not automatically mean that every aspect of their medical care falls within an operational duty under Article 2.

The obligation is one of reasonable protection against qualifying risks. It is not a guarantee that harm will be prevented.


The Significance of State Responsibility

One of the central issues in Maguire was the extent to which Jackie’s vulnerability and deprivation of liberty brought her within the protection of the operational duty.

The Supreme Court considered the responsibilities assumed by the care home and the distinction between providing day-to-day care and providing medical treatment.

Jackie’s placement and deprivation of liberty did not, just by itself, establish that the state owed an operational duty extending to every decision made about her medical treatment.

Nevertheless, the Court recognised that the care home had responsibilities to respond appropriately to serious risks to her health, including securing access to medical assistance.

The care home staff had sought medical advice and called an ambulance. They were entitled, in the circumstances, to rely upon the professional judgments of the doctors and paramedics concerning the need for hospital admission.

The Court therefore rejected the argument that there had been an arguable breach of the operational duty by the care home. [§185 – §204]

This distinction is particularly important in cases involving vulnerable adults.

The fact that a person requires extensive care, lacks capacity or is subject to state-authorised restrictions upon their liberty does not necessarily transform every alleged failure in medical treatment into a breach of Article 2.

The nature of the state’s responsibility, and the particular risk against which protection is said to have been required, must be identified.


Clinical Negligence and Article 2

The judgment reinforces the distinction between ordinary clinical negligence and breaches of the state’s positive obligations under Article 2.

A death may involve serious clinical failings without necessarily engaging the enhanced investigative obligation.

For example, allegations concerning delayed diagnosis, inadequate assessment, poor communication or a failure to arrange hospital admission may give rise to questions of negligence.

Those allegations do not automatically establish that the state’s systems duty or operational duty has been breached.

Conversely, the involvement of healthcare professionals does not exclude Article 2.

There may be circumstances in which failures go beyond individual clinical judgment and reveal deficiencies in the systems intended to protect life, or in which the state fails to discharge a particular operational responsibility.

The distinction is therefore not simply between medical deaths and non-medical deaths. It requires an assessment of the nature of the alleged failure and the relevant positive obligation.


The Enhanced Investigative Obligation

Article 2 also imposes procedural obligations upon the state, which in the UK can be discharged at an Inquest.

In appropriate cases, the state must conduct an effective investigation into a death, including circumstances suggesting a possible breach of its substantive obligations.

For coronial purposes, the enhanced investigative obligation may require the inquest to examine not merely by what means the deceased died, but in what circumstances the death occurred.

This is reflected in section 5(2) of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009.

However, Maguire confirms that the enhanced investigative obligation does not arise simply because a death may have resulted from clinical negligence.

In ordinary medical negligence cases, the state’s procedural obligations may be satisfied through the availability of appropriate civil proceedings and other mechanisms capable of establishing responsibility.

The enhanced obligation is distinct. Its application requires careful consideration of whether the circumstances give rise to an arguable breach of a relevant substantive obligation, or otherwise engage the enhanced procedural duty.

The Supreme Court also confirmed that the position may change as the evidence develops.

A Coroner may initially consider that the enhanced obligation applies, but subsequently conclude that the evidence does not support its continued application.

Equally, evidence emerging during an investigation may demonstrate that the scope of the inquiry must be expanded [§25-§33]

The decision therefore reinforces the importance of keeping Article 2 under review throughout the coronial investigation.


The Supreme Court’s Decision

The Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the appeal. It concluded that the evidence did not establish an arguable breach of the relevant systems or operational duties which required the enhanced investigative obligation to apply.

In particular, the Court rejected the contention that the alleged failures in medical treatment demonstrated systemic dysfunction of the kind required to engage Article 2.

It also rejected the argument that the care home had arguably breached its operational duty.

Although the healthcare professionals’ decisions were open to criticism, the circumstances did not establish the particular form of state responsibility required to bring the case within the enhanced investigative obligation.

The Coroner had therefore been entitled to conclude that an expanded conclusion was not required.


Practical Implications for Inquests

The decision has several important consequences for practitioners.

First, allegations of clinical negligence should not be treated as sufficient, without further analysis, to engage the enhanced investigative obligation under Article 2.

Secondly, submissions concerning the systems duty should identify the particular regulatory, administrative or organisational deficiency alleged, rather than merely describing a series of clinical errors as systemic.

Thirdly, where reliance is placed upon the operational duty, it is necessary to identify the nature of the state’s responsibility, the relevant risk to life, the knowledge of that risk and the reasonable protective measures said to have been required.

Fourthly, particular care is required where the deceased was vulnerable, lacked capacity or was subject to a deprivation of liberty authorisation. Those circumstances may be highly relevant, but they are not determinative.

Finally, Article 2 should be kept under review as the evidence develops. Its application is not necessarily resolved permanently at the outset of the investigation. It is quite common for Article 2 to be engaged, or indeed disengaged, as the evidence is produced.

The decision does not diminish the importance of investigating deaths involving possible medical failings. Rather, it clarifies the distinction between the ordinary statutory functions of an inquest and the additional requirements arising from Article 2.


Conclusion

Maguire is an important authority on the limits of Article 2 in healthcare and residential care settings.

It confirms that vulnerability, state involvement and alleged clinical negligence do not, either individually or collectively, necessarily establish that the enhanced investigative obligation applies.

The central question is whether the circumstances engage a relevant substantive obligation under Article 2, having regard to the nature of the state’s responsibility and the particular failure alleged.

For practitioners, the decision underlines the importance of precise, evidence-based submissions which distinguish clinical failings from breaches of the systems or operational duties.

For families, it is important to recognise that a decision not to engage the enhanced investigative obligation does not mean that concerns about the care provided are irrelevant, or that the circumstances of the death cannot be examined at an inquest. The statutory investigation may still identify significant failures in care, causation and the circumstances surrounding the death, subject to the ordinary limits of coronial jurisdiction.


Further Reading